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Abstract
We produce the first systematic study of the determinants and implications of in-person 
banking. Using survey data from the U.S., we show that firms which are informationally 
opaque or operate in rural areas are liable to contact their primary bank in-person. This ten-
dency extends to older, less educated, and female business owners. We find that a relation-
ship based on face-to-face communication, on average, lasts 17.88 months longer, spans a 
wider range of financial services, and is more likely to be exclusive. The associated loans 
mature 3.37 months later and bear interest rates which are 11 basis points lower. For good 
quality firms, in-person communication also relates to less discouraged borrowing. These 
results are robust to multiple approaches for endogeneity, including recursive bivariate pro-
bits, treatment effect models, and instrumental variables regressions. Overall, our findings 
offer empirical grounding to soft information theory and a note of caution to banks against 
suppressing channels of interpersonal communication.
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1 Introduction
Modern technology has revolutionized communication with banking institutions, offering 
users a high degree of autonomy and geographic liberalization. Everyday examples include 
online banking (Hernández-Murillo et  al. 2010), ATMs in off-site locations (Magnac 
2017), and mobile banking (Baptista and Oliveira 2015). Yet, small businesses have never 
been at the forefront of these innovations. U.S. evidence from the Federal Reserve’s Survey 
of Small Business Finances (SSBF) shows that only a fourth of the participant firms are 
willing to utilize some impersonal banking channel as a substitute for face-to-face com-
munication with bank officers, raising two main questions. Why are certain firms more 
likely than others to visit the bank’s premises? How do in-person interactions compare 
with impersonal banking in terms of contribution to financial intermediation efficiency?
Small businesses face considerable difficulty in raising  capital from stock markets. 
Their limited organizational footprint heightens concerns over adverse selection and moral 
hazard, calling for a level of information production which is disproportionately high to 
the available resources (Ang 1991). A preferred alternative is bank credit, mainly because 
it enables the transcendence of informational asymmetries through the repeated borrower-
lender interactions (Rosenfeld 2014; D’Aurizio et al. 2015; Beck et al. 2018). As per sub-
stantial theoretical work (Boot 2000; Stein 2002; Berger and Udell 2002, 2006; Liberti 
and Petersen 2019), a distinctive feature of relationship banking is that part of the lend-
ing decision is based on soft information which, unlike hard information (e.g. accounting 
records, credit scores, history of payments), is neither quantifiable nor in any other manner 
observable by the market. Importantly, “with soft information, the context under which the 
information is collected and the collector of the information are part of the information. It 
is not possible to separate the two” (Liberti and Petersen 2019, pp. 3–4).
To disentangle the relative importance of soft and hard information over the course of 
the bank-firm relationship is unrealistic. However, it is equally unrealistic to assume it con-
stant, given an environment of increasing technological automation and the vast heteroge-
neity of small firms’ characteristics. Relatedly, a shortcoming of the dominant empirical 
approach is the implicit assumption that a large number of interactions, as over a wide 
time frame or product range, suffice to enable the relationships effects (Petersen and Rajan 
1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano 2010; Cas-
telli et al. 2012; Karolyi 2018; Mi and Han 2020). By downplaying the importance of how 
the two parties actually communicate, this approach renders the soft information flow 
untraceable, obfuscating the sources of the added value of relationship banking. After all, 
if the main driver of the relationship is still hard data, relationship banking would not be 
fundamentally different from transactions-based banking technologies (e.g. financial state-
ment or asset-based lending).
Motivated by this disconnect between theory and empirical investigation, we aim to 
capture more of the role of soft information on small business finance than is currently 
reflected in the literature. Towards this, the present paper offers, for the first time, a rig-
orous treatment of the determinants and implications of in-person banking by drawing 
evidence from a sample of 12,438 firms with less than 500 employees, spanning 9 U.S. 
regions, and 10 SIC divisions. Central to our approach is a previously overlooked SSBF 
question which sets the framework of a useful dichotomy: firms choosing to interact with 
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their primary financial institution1 in-person vis-à-vis firms mainly relying on impersonal 
communication methods (internet, post, etc.). Underlying our approach is the recognition 
that soft information resides within in-person contact, whereas alternative communica-
tion channels tend to suppress it. Hence, although we have no way of filtering out hard 
information, by choosing to focus on the communication mode, we can ensure that every 
firm within our sample of interest also yields substantial soft information—a condition that 
prior studies are unable to provide.
Exploiting this property of our dataset, we first seek to enlighten our understanding of 
the factors invoking face-to-face interactions. Our expectation is that this need surfaces 
when the hardening of information is: (1) costlier, as when the firm is informationally 
opaque (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Schwert 2018); and (2) of limited reusability, as 
within rural banking markets (Cole et al. 2004; DeYoung et al. 2012). We ascribe much of 
the remaining variation to owners’ characteristics which drive organisational choices to a 
larger extent in the context of small business (Raymond 1985). Subsequently, we seek to 
capture the implications. Ceteris paribus, a higher frequency of in-person communication 
levels the informational playing field more than is attainable via impersonal communica-
tion. In turn, a treatment of information asymmetries equates to a treatment of the common 
root of three major challenges in small business banking: high borrowing costs (Datta et al. 
1999), tight lending horizons (Ortiz-Molina and Penas 2008), and discouraged borrowers’ 
propensity to self-ration (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Kon and Storey 2003; Han et al. 2009). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that credit becomes cheaper and more available for in-person 
communicators, consolidating their relationship with the bank.
Our findings are in line with the above conjectures. In our determinants tests, we obtain 
two primary results that are new to the literature. First, banking market conditions, after 
controlling for potential confounding factors, emerge as a strong driver of in-person con-
tact, which supports the theoretical conjectures of Boot and Thakor (2000) and Hauswald 
and Marquez (2006) about the link between banking market structure and soft information 
transmission. Second, we document the incremental significance of small business own-
ers’ characteristics on determining the nature of the relationship with the main bank; the 
inclusion of proxies for demographics and educational attainment not only increases the 
explanatory power of our probit model but also reveals the high marginal effects of these 
variables. On this basis, we sketch the profile of owners more liable to steer their firms 
towards in-person banking as predominantly female, older and less educated individuals.
Next, we test for a causal effect of the communication dichotomy on a variety of bank-
ing outcomes. As we find, a preponderance of face-to-face interactions benefits both ends 
of the relationship: (1) the bank experiences increased loyalty from small firms; and (2) the 
latter gain access to cheaper credit for an extended period of time. These effects are of high 
economic significance. A relationship based on in-person communication, on average, lasts 
17.88 months longer and is 24.46% more likely to be the firm’s sole banking relationship; 
the associated loans mature 3.37 months later and bear interest rates which are 11 basis 
points lower. Furthermore, we complement the traditional proxies for relationship strength 
(e.g. Berger et al. 2005) with a new and comprehensive measure, services concentration, 
defined as the proportion of financial services a firm purchases from the primary bank rela-
tive to the total financial services it utilizes. As an outcome variable, this ratio confirms 
1 The relationship with the primary financial institution, being less transaction-oriented and conducive to 
private information acquisition, serves as a focal point for much of the empirical work in relationship bank-
ing (e.g. Berger and Udell 1998; Berger et al. 2001; Ono et al. 2014).
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that in-person communication drives not only the credit decision but also the totality of a 
small firm’s banking needs. Finally, we find that the likelihood of discouraged borrowing 
is smaller for in-person communicators, albeit with a caveat. Because the effect holds for 
borrowers of good quality only, this finding is indicative of a decrease in screening errors 
made by the bank rather than a window of opportunity for bad borrowers.
Endogeneity poses a valid concern in our empirical setting. This is mainly due to addi-
tional factors which might correlate with the communication decision but lie outside the 
SSBF scope. For example, Uchida et al. (2012) caution that a high loan officer turnover 
undermines the bank’s ability to act as an information repository and Schoar (2012) finds 
that bonding (or lack thereof) with the bank’s relationship manager explains a portion of 
the variability in borrowers’ delinquency. To address this concern, we conduct a battery 
of tests, including recursive bivariate probit estimation and treatment effect models, which 
jointly create a framework for inferences least distorted by selection and / or omitted vari-
ables bias.
As a new and refined lens of soft information, our in-person contact approach speaks to 
a longstanding deficiency in literature: “existing work falls short in that it has not measured 
the precise sources of the added value of relationship banking” Boot (2000 p. 21). The 
most important contribution of this paper, therefore, is our ability to assign the observed 
effects to soft information and know that soft information, rather than any other element of 
the bank-firm relationship, represents the actual cause. In this vein, we provide empirical 
grounding to the theoretical predictions of the relationship banking literature (Stein 2002; 
Berger and Udell 2002, 2006; Liberti and Petersen 2019) and demonstrate the salience of 
soft information with evidence that is both objective and measurable.
Another contribution is to shed light on a hitherto unknown aspect of soft information 
production. The aim to capture the underlying mechanism which generates soft informa-
tion is explicit in the studies of Uchida et al. (2012) and Hattori et al. (2015) which debate 
whether loan officers or the branch manager, respectively, play the leading role in the pro-
cess; and implicit in studies analysing the characteristics which make a bank most recep-
tive to this type of information (Petersen and Rajan 1995, 2002; Berger et al. 2005, 2014). 
While this research makes inroads on the bank’s ability to capitalize on soft information, 
we focus on the transmitting end, showing how likely a small firm is to provide critical 
input in the first place.
Finally, we contribute to two evolving strands of research by offering: (1) a partial rem-
edy, in the form of in-person contact, to the challenge of discouraged borrowing in small 
business banking (Kon and Storey 2003; Han et al. 2009; Chakravarty and Xiang 2013); 
and (2) generalizable insight which is of interest to research investigating the efficacy of 
communication methods in entrepreneurial settings (e.g. Casson and Giusta 2007; Sarapai-
vanich and Patterson 2015).
Boiled down, this paper is a note of caution for both banks and their small business 
customers. The former should provide adequate space for subtle, noncontractual informa-
tion to emerge, or else their unremitting investment in technological automation2 is likely 
to eliminate a key value driver. From the small business perspective, impersonal banking 
channels should be utilized on the understanding that they represent inferior substitutes for 
relationships built on face-to-face interactions.
2 The International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates the aggregate investment of U.S. retail banks in 
information technology at $20.2 billion in 2017, forecasting an increase at an annual growth rate of about 
10.5% into 2019.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant liter-
ature. We develop our hypotheses in Sect. 3 and present the dataset in Sect. 4. The empiri-
cal results are in Sect. 5. The paper concludes in Sect. 6.
2  Background literature
Sourcing capital has always been an arduousendeavour for small businesses and indeed a 
financier has important reasons to shy away from this economic sector. First, small firms 
typically lack the managerial skills and resources to produce accounting records or other 
data useful to investors (Ang 1991). Hence, whether the owner has a pipeline of posi-
tive NPV projects to invest in (adverse selection problem) or whether she stands willing 
to channel funds towards these as opposed to subpar investments (moral hazard problem) 
are warranted concerns. Second and related, future prospects might be linked to owners’ 
characteristics which are either irreplaceable or, in part, unobservable (Bates 2005). Third, 
organizations of smaller size are vulnerable to environmental factors with a dramatically 
higher likelihood of failure (Hart and Oulton 1996).3 Consequently, with the exception of 
high-growth firms which might be on private equity’s radar, financing options for the vast 
majority of small businesses reduce to bank lending.
Banks are equipped to manage firm-specific uncertainty, the root cause of the above 
concerns, by their capacity to gather and integrate into the lending decision information 
generated from the interactions with clients. The greater the frequency of interactions, the 
more input becomes available and, hence, the greater the value added of the relationship 
banking (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995; Hernández-Cánovas and 
Martínez-Solano 2010; Bharath et al. 2011; Castelli et al. 2012; Karolyi 2018; Tian and 
Han 2019). In spite of its vast volume, the relevant literature obtains evidence from a lim-
ited number of empirical proxies. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and Iturralde et  al. 
(2010) identify the three most popular in the following relationship dimensions: (1) dura-
tion, i.e. how long the firm has been the bank’s client; (2) breadth i.e. the range of services 
that the bank-firm relationship involves; and (3) concentration i.e. the firm’s total banking 
relationships.
Yet, unlike what such proxies imply, the informational output of relationship banking 
is not homogenous. This recognition becomes for first time explicit in Stein (2002) and 
Berger and Udell (2002) who address theoretically the interplay between organizational 
structure and financial intermediation, arriving at a common conclusion: flatter bank hier-
archies represent better fits for small business lending. As described in Liberti and Petersen 
(2019), information comprises two distinct types, hard and soft. The former is quantifi-
able—think, for example, of financial ratios and credit scores (Udell 2008)—and, hence, 
transmissible by technology such as internet banking or other mediums (Petersen and 
Rajan 2002; Berger et al. 2005; Hertzberg et al. 2010). Conversely, soft information neither 
fits in numbers nor can it be evaluated separately from the physical setting which generates 
it; for instance, loan officers’ conviction that a certain small business owner is liable to 
deliver because of character and innate aversion to delinquency. Table 1 Panel A summa-
rizes the main characteristics of each information type; Table 1 Panel B illustrates how the 
3 Hart and Oulton come up with an interesting rule of thumb whereby the probability of corporate death 
declines by 5% for every doubling in size until the firm attains a critical threshold of 1000 employees.
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ability to process soft information differentiates relationship lending from all other lending 
technologies. The description provided explains why a clean measure of soft information is 
unattainable. Harder to explain is why, although soft information is exclusive to in-person 
communication, the empirical literature evaluates relationship effects without taking into 
account the mode of communication.
We note three studies attentive to the physical setting of the bank-firm interactions,4 two 
of which using survey-based evidence from Japan: Uchida et al. (2012) and Hattori et al. 
(2015). The former study finds that in-person contact improves firms’ perceptions about: 
(i) access to credit and (ii) the extent to which their idiosyncrasy and needs become appre-
hensible by banks. The latter study documents that face-to-face interactions with clients are 
among the key factors which enable branch managers to act as information repositories, 
more so than loan officers do. Taken together, this evidence, while subjective and of lim-
ited generalizability due to the special (keiretsu) character of the Japanese capital market, 
supports the capacity of in-person communication to reduce friction in the borrower-lender 
relationship.
From the Italian setting, Gabbi et al. (2020) document an inverse association between 
the cost of bank loans and the frequency of face-to-face meetings, especially when these 
are held at the firm’s headquarters. Our research is similar to theirs in that we relate the 
communication mode to actual banking outcomes rather than firms’ perceptions of them, 
yet different in a number of ways. First, we present the first evidence, to date, from the 
world’s largest economy, the U.S, using the same data that the Federal Reserve collects via 
a nationwide census and relies upon to form policy. Second, the time period in Gabbi et al. 
spans from 2009 to 2011, consistent with the study’s focus on gauging the effects of credit 
tightening in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. By contrast, the recurring 
nature of the SSBF survey enables us to capture a period extending longer than a decade, 
including the booming stock market of the 1990s, the subsequent crush, and the recovery 
in the early 2000s, a through-the-cycle approach which is not exclusively tied to a specific 
economic environment. Third, our interest lies in developing a symmetric understanding 
of both the determinants and implications of in-person banking. On the implications side, 
while borrowing cost is one of our outcome variables, so is an array of other important 
dimensions including duration, exclusivity, number of financial services purchased, loan 
maturity, and the phenomenon of discouraged borrowing. The next section delves into the 
causal mechanism explaining how the communication mode can exert a multifaceted influ-
ence on the relationship.
3  Hypothesis development
3.1  In‑person banking: determinants
Our first set of hypotheses relates to small firms’ incentives to contact their primary bank 
in-person. We associate these with a quantifiable component, which is the cost of harden-
ing information, and a subjective component, which is the appeal of face-to-face interac-
tions to small business owners.
4 The lender-firm, as opposed to the bank-firm, method of communication features as a covariate in 
Petersen and Rajan (2002), where lenders indiscriminately include relationship-oriented primary lenders 
and transaction-oriented non-primary lenders.
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Consider the production of hard information first. Within the small business taxonomy, 
certain firms are smaller than others, possessing even less resources to commit to it. From 
a complementary perspective, Lang and Lundholm (1993) view the pertinent cost as an 
increasing function of informational opacity. Berger et al. (2001) indicate multiple reasons 
(poor accounting records, lack of skill, a lower public profile) in support of an inverse asso-
ciation between firm size and opacity. Consequently, the smaller a firm, the greater its dis-
advantage at hardening information for external users, rendering interpersonal communica-
tion more probable. Formally, we state our first testable hypothesis as follows:
H.1. In small business, the likelihood of contacting the primary bank in-person is inversely 
associated with firm size.
When information becomes standardized and available to multiple users, transaction 
costs decrease (Liberti and Petersen 2019). Scale economies in information production, 
however, depend on the structure of the local banking market. A smaller number of banks 
as well as fewer hierarchical layers within the banks limit the scope for information reus-
ability. Rural areas typify both conditions, making interpersonal communication a cost-
effective alternative. The converse relates to metropolitan areas. From the perspective of 
the bank, this distinction has a profound effect on how hard and soft information reflect on 
customer evaluation. In particular, character is prioritized when the social and civic fabric 
of the local community can readily supply pertinent information. By contrast, in settings 
which naturally preclude this possibility, the adherence to formal financial criteria and the 
cookie cutter approach prevail (Cole et al. 2004; DeYoung et al. 2012). Thus, we formulate 
our next hypothesis as follows:
H.2. Small businesses are more likely to contact the primary bank in-person in rural areas.
Naturally, the mode of communication may also be subject to individual choices. Prior 
research affirms that, due to their size, small firms echo owners’ human capital and ante-
cedent traits. While plenty could find an application in our context, certain demograph-
ics—age, gender, and education—are of particular relevance. Accordingly, the in-person 
approach is compatible with small business owners who are:
Older Further to the recognition that these individuals have relied on low-tech processes 
for a longer period of time, aging begets deterioration in cognitive ability as well as in 
self-efficacy (i.e. the conviction that one is capable of performing a given task). Hence, 
tradition and simplicity in processes are preferred to innovation and complexity. For 
example, there is evidence of a negative association between R&D spending and CEO 
age (Barker III and Mueller 2002).
Female Similar to older individuals, females value simplicity. Venkatesh and Mor-
ris (2000), investigating workplace acceptance of information technology, find that 
the usage decision for female (male) employees depends on the perceived ease of use 
(functional capabilities). Moreover, females have a natural proclivity to form personal 
relationships, invoking network-oriented communication with less adherence to social 
hierarchies (Chai et al. 2011).
Less educated Literature widely uses education as a proxy for cognitive ability, imply-
ing a positive relation between academic attainment and the ability to manage complex-
ity (e.g. Miller et al. 2015; King et al. 2016). In addition, Shoda et al. (1990) and Parker 
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and Fischoff (2005) provide the more subtle insight that a growing intellect holds back 
impulsive behaviour. Drawing parallels with small business banking, less educated 
owners appear less likely to embrace technology and prone to visit the bank more often 
than is necessary.
In sum, we derive the following hypotheses:
H.3.a. In small business, the likelihood of contacting the primary bank in-person is posi-
tively associated with the owner’s age.
H.3.b. In small business, the likelihood of contacting the primary bank in-person increases 
when the owner is female.
H.3.c. In small business, the likelihood of contacting the primary bank in-person increases 
for less educated owners.
3.2  In‑person banking: implications
Our remaining hypotheses relate to the impact of in-person banking, which we investigate 
at three distinct levels.
The first level comprises the breadth and depth of banking relationships which we col-
lectively refer to as ‘strength’. As noted earlier, soft information is imparted gradually over 
multiple (face-to-face) interactions, whereas its nature makes re-verification costly and 
uncertain (Stein 2002; Liberti and Petersen 2019). Thus, if a small business has already 
transmitted a large amount of soft information to a bank, it is likely that it will stay within 
the relationship, as switching to another bank implies the elimination of the value of the 
accumulated soft information. Formally, we develop the following hypothesis:
H.4. Small firms which contact the primary bank in-person build stronger banking 
relationships.
The second level of our investigation concerns contractual features of the relationship, 
i.e. loan interest rate and maturity. Due to acute information asymmetries, these typically 
entail disadvantageous terms for small businesses. On the cost side, loan rates increase in 
order to reflect the additional resources committed to monitoring and information acquisi-
tion. On the maturity side, a shorter loan duration enables lenders to assess borrower-spe-
cific information period by period, which allows for timely interventions should the default 
risk changes. In support of the conservative stance, Berger and Frame (2007) document a 
negative association between maturity and information opacity proxied by firm size, age, 
R&D, and depreciation. For borrowers, however, a shorter maturity begets inflexibility and 
capital rationing which might preclude investment opportunities with a longer life cycle 
(Ortiz-Molina and Penas 2008).
Because the in-person approach offers a more complete picture of the small business 
customer and, hence, a partial treatment to the information asymmetry problem, the con-
tractual terms of the banking relationship should improve. Parallel to this framework, Lib-
erti and Petersen (2019 p. 13) speculate that an auxiliary behavioral mechanism might 
come into play, whereby “loan officers can also use their discretion to put a thumb on 
the scale and influence a loan decision for their own benefit”. Whether involving a fully 
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rational decision making or not, face-to-face communication is predicted to have an empir-
ically equivalent effect on the cost and availability of credit, supporting our next set of 
hypotheses:
H.5.a. Small firms which contact the primary bank in-person have access to loans with 
lower interest rates.
H.5.b. Small firms which contact the primary bank in-person have access to loans with 
longer maturities.
At a third and final level, we look at the role of in-person banking in efficient capital 
allocation using the paradigm of discouraged borrowers, i.e. small firms which are in need 
of funds and yet refrain from submitting a loan application due to fear of rejection. As per 
the seminal study of Kon and Storey (2003), self-rationing incentives emanate from the 
double recognition that, under imperfect information, banks are vulnerable to screening 
errors and applications costs can be considerable. Kon and Storey also acknowledge a non-
monetary cost component which relates to entrepreneurs’ discomfort about sharing sensi-
tive data about themselves and their enterprises with a third party.
We argue that imparting borrower-specific intelligence in a direct and interpersonal 
fashion may not only allay the need for expensive hard information but also make entrepre-
neurs less hesitant to assert their financing needs. Moreover, there should be an asymmetric 
effect between good and bad quality borrowers as only the former stand to benefit from the 
leveling of the informational playing field. Hence, we develop our hypotheses as follows:
H.6.a. In-person banking reduces the probability of discouragement for good quality 
borrowers.
H.6.b. In-person banking does not relate to the probability of discouragement for bad qual-
ity borrowers.
4  Data
All data comes from the Federal Reserve’s 1993, 1998 and 2003 Survey of Small Business 
Finances (1993 NSSBF, 1998 SSBF and 2003 SSBF)5 covering the period 1993–2005. 
Because of its credibility and thoroughness, the SSBF continues to be a leading data source 
for a host of recent studies in small business (e.g. Berger et al. 2011; Cassar et al. 2015; 
Cole and Sokolyk 2016; Dai et al. 2017; Durguner 2017; Han et al. 2017). The survey par-
ticipants comprise 12,438 enterprises (4637 from 1993 NSSBF, 3561 from 1998 and 4240 
SSBF) with less than 500 employees, and represent every U.S. region and industry with the 
exception of agricultural businesses, non-profit organizations, government entities and sub-
sidiaries. In addition, the SSBF provides sampling weights so that the data correctly repre-
sents the population of small businesses, overcoming bias due to disproportionate sampling 
and nonresponse. Echoing the call in prior literature for research designs attentive to this 
adjustment, we fully incorporate the sampling weights in all analysis in the study.
5 Detailed survey information is available at: https:// www. feder alres erve. gov/ pubs/ oss/ oss3/ nssbf toc. htm.
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Table  2 defines the SSBF variables used in the study and presents key descriptive 
statistics. Confirming the preponderance of face-to-face interactions in small business 
finance, 77% of firms are shown to interact with their primary financial institution most 
frequently in-person. Table 3 Panel A identifies the proportion of in-person banking for 
each category of the independent binary variables (X) in the subsequent regressions and 
univariately compares the differences in means. As shown, in-person banking is most 
prevalent in rural areas, when the primary financial institution is a commercial bank, 
and for owners who are female or lack a university degree. Table 3 Panel B compares 
the mean value of each dependent variable (Y) based on the communication dichotomy. 
The two groups systematically differ along most dimensions. In-person communicators, 
on average, give rise to longer and more exclusive banking relationships, while they also 
purchase more services from the primary financial institution. Their loyalty appears to 
result in longer maturity loans.
5  Empirical analysis
We investigate our hypotheses in a multivariate regression framework using several esti-
mation methods. Central to all subsequent analyses is the variable in-person, set equal to 
1 if the firm communicates most frequently with the primary financial institution face-
to-face, and zero otherwise. The variable coding is based on the respective SSBF ques-
tion requesting the identification of the main (most frequent) banking method from a list 
of options that includes in-person and a variety of impersonal ways (e.g. by post, inter-
net, ATM, etc.). Unfortunately, the survey requires no further clarification on the num-
ber of bank-firm interactions and it therefore becomes impossible to distinguish firms 
using in-person communication exclusively from firms which utilize a blend of in-per-
son and impersonal ways of banking. Even so, our research design can ensure not only 
that soft information transmission has taken place but also that the method which makes 
this possible, i.e. face-to face interaction, has been used more times than any other mode 
of communication with the primary financial institution. In line with our study’s dual 
aim, this section proceeds in two steps. First, we use in-person as the dependent vari-
able to gauge the key determinants. Subsequently, we place it on the right-hand side to 
assess its explanatory power over the banking outcomes of relationship strength (i.e. 
length of relationship, exclusivity, services concentration), loan contracting (i.e. interest 
rate, maturity of loans), and discouraged borrowing. To fully exploit our dataset, we run 
each regression using pooled data from 1993 NSSBF, 1998 SSBF, and 2003 SSBF as in 
Berger et  al. (2011), and supplement these results with separate evidence drawn from 
each individual round as in Cole and Sokolyk (2016).
5.1  The decision to contact the primary bank in‑person
Starting from the determinants, our ex ante expectation was that the propensity for face-
to-face communication increases with a smaller firm size (H1) and a rural banking mar-
ket (H2). As a joint test to these hypotheses, we specify the following probit model:
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where in-person is regressed on our firm size proxy employees (Wagner 2001; Angelini 
and Generale 2008) and rural area which is coded as 1 if a firm locates in a non-met-
ropolitan statistical area, and 0 otherwise (Berger et al. 2011). Firm-specific variables as 
well as other factors might exert a confounding influence on selecting the interaction mode 
with the main bank; we account for this possibility by the inclusion of covariates regu-
larly appearing in studies utilizing the SSBF dataset (see, e.g., Cole and Sokolyk 2016; Dai 
et al. 2017). Specifically, we employ the dichotomous variables of: corporation indicating 
whether or not the firm has attained a corporate form; startup flagging an age of 2 years or 
younger; recent failure evidenced either by a bankruptcy within the last 7 years or firm’s 
delinquent behavior within the last 3 years; and commercial bank indicating whether the 
firm’s primary financial provider is a commercial bank or another institution. The fixed 
effects control for the SIC division and geographic region. Finally, ε denotes the error term.
As predicted by H3, owners’ personal attributes are more likely to be discernible in the 
organizational choices of small businesses, claiming an incremental effect on our depend-
ent variable. To test this hypothesis, we complement the set of covariates in Model 1 with 
variables capturing the principal owner’s gender, education (i.e. whether the owner’s high-
est educational qualification is below the level of a bachelor’s degree) and age. Accord-
ingly, we specify Model 2 as follows:
Table 4 presents the results from both models. Model 1 confirms that employees and 
rural area reflect on the decision about the physical setting of the communication with 
the primary bank. The coefficients on the two variables, both statistically significant at the 
1% level, display the theoretically predicted signs: smaller firms as well as those operat-
ing in rural areas favor the in-person approach supporting H1 and H2, respectively. Based 
on the pooled data, the marginal effect of employees is -6.33%, becoming − 1.06% at the 
variable’s median value (5 employees) estimated as -6.33% / (1 + 5). Simply put, the likeli-
hood of contacting the primary financial institution in-person decreases by 1.06% for every 
additional employee. The marginal effect of rural area indicates that, in a non-metropolitan 
statistical area, the in-person method is 7.13% more likely than in a metropolitan area. The 
highest marginal effect, 23.57%, relates to commercial bank, which suggests that firms tend 
to contact banks in-person more often than other financial providers, alluding to the form-
ers’ ability to process soft information (Berger and Udell 2006; Liberti and Petersen 2019). 
Overall, the model yields a pseudo-R2 of 8.89%.
If in-person banking simply mirrors the personal choice of small business owners, the 
above results should disappear with the inclusion of the additional variables in Model 2. 
This, however, is not the case, as all Model 1 findings remain qualitatively similar. Net of 
firm and banking market characteristics, the evidence in support of owners’ fixed effects 
leads to three main insights. First, owners lacking a bachelor’s degree are 6.77% more 
likely to visit the bank premises compared with university graduates. Second, the resulting 
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to choose in-person banking with a marginal effect of 2.58%. Third, the older the individ-
ual, the stronger the appeal of in-person banking, which highlights the element of simplic-
ity embedded into face-to-face interactions. The marginal effect is 5.30%, implying that the 
probability of in-person banking increases by 0.10%6 for each additional year of owner’s 
age. Jointly, the variables on the owners’ characteristics increase the pseudo-R2 to 9.49% 
and sketch a profile for in-person communicators which is compatible with hypotheses 
H.3.a, H.3.b, and H.3.c. The clear implication of this evidence is that impersonal technolo-
gies or other banking automations, if applied indiscriminately, might alienate an important 
clientele which would otherwise generate considerable soft information.
Extending the above analysis to each individual SSBF round, in Models 3 to 8, the 
results are largely consistent with the pooled data, particularly with regard to rural area, 
firm size and owners’ education.
5.2  The impact of contacting the primary bank in‑person
Because the capacity to inform decisions with soft information remains exclusive to in-
person contact, the latter should also entail unique implications. To gauge these, we specify 
equations which draw the dependent variable from a large pool of banking outcomes but 
use a common set of independent variables: in-person and the covariates which previously 
entered into the determinants regressions.
In estimating the equations, we are confronted with the problem of endogeneity which 
might arise from factors potentially correlating with the communication decision but 
remaining unobservable to the SSBF survey. Indicatively, Uchida et al. (2012) caution that 
loan officers’ turnover undermines the bank’s ability to act as an information repository 
and Schoar (2012) finds that bonding (or lack thereof) with bank relationship managers 
explains some of the variation in borrowers’ delinquency. To allay such concerns, all find-
ings are subjected to a rigorous treatment for endogeneity which is described in detail in 
the appendices to this paper.
5.2.1  In‑person contact and strength of banking relationship
To test H4, we introduce four relationship strength proxies and consider the following 
associations.
5.2.1.1 In‑person contact and length of banking relationship Our first proxy, relationship 
length, is measured by the number of months that the firm has been receiving services from 
the primary bank, following Berger et al. (2005). We examine the interplay of this variable 
with the communication dichotomy by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) and treatment 
effects (TE) estimation (“Appendix 1”). In the latter procedure, our instrument in the 1st-
stage regressions is the variable in-person environment, defined as the proportion of firms 
using face-to-face communication with their primary bank within the firm’s geographic 
region and business sector. Intuitively, a preference for this communication mode from the 
firm’s peer group strongly correlates with in-person; at the same time, the exogenous nature 
of the former variable precludes it from exerting a bearing on the dependent variable in the 
2nd-stage, which is a necessary condition for satisfying the exclusion restriction.
6 0.10% = 5.30%
1+51.00
 , where 51.00 is the median value of owner’s age.
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The results are reported in Table  5. The positive and statistically significant (at 1% 
level) coefficient on in-person affirms that face-to-face interactions enhance the longevity 
of the relationship. In assessing the magnitude of the effect, we note the statistical signifi-
cance of both the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) and the χ2 statistic derived from the Wald test. 
This evidence substantiates the endogeneity concerns, attaching increased validity to the 
TE method over OLS (Greene 2012; Guo and Fraser 2015). Based on the endogeneity-
corrected estimates (Model 5), the average length of the primary banking relationship for 
in-person communicators is 76.43 months, decreasing to 58.55 months for the rest of the 
sample firms. The difference, about one-fifth, is substantial and aligned with the notion that 
once a significant amount of soft information has been transmitted, the firm typically com-
mits to the incumbent banking relationship due to the high verification cost of this type of 
information for a third party (Bertomeu and Marinovic 2016). Models 6 to 8 provide sepa-
rate evidence from each individual round in support of this conclusion.
5.2.1.2 In‑person contact and exclusivity of banking relationship A host of studies identify 
the firm’s network of banking relationships by counting the number of different financial 
services providers (e.g. Han et al. 2008; Iturralde et al. 2010; Castelli et al. 2012; Yu et al. 
2015). Other studies focus on whether or not the firm maintains a sole (exclusive) banking 
relationship (Elsas 2005; Berger et al. 2008). For our purpose, we exploit both proxies to 
apply two methodologically disparate procedures: (1) a regression with treatment effects 
(TE) on the count variable of banking relations; and (2) a recursive bivariate probit (RBP) 
on the dummy variable of exclusivity (“Appendix 2”). Both methods instrument in-person 
with the exogenous variable in-person environment, which does not directly relate to bank-
ing relations or exclusivity.
The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. As displayed in Table 6, the TE model sug-
gests that firms contacting the primary bank in-person maintain fewer banking ties than 
firms applying impersonal communication. The RBP model, in Table 7, concludes simi-
larly by showing that—based on the pooled data (Model 5)—in-person communicators are 
24.46% more likely to develop an exclusive banking relationship. The regression results 
from the individual survey rounds (Models 6–8) are consistent with the inferences sup-
ported by the pooled data. Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 complement the findings 
on the duration of the bank-firm collaboration, highlighting loyalty as an additional dimen-
sion of the relationship.
5.2.1.3 In‑person contact and financial services concentration As a fourth and final proxy 
for banking relationship strength, we introduce a novel measure to the literature, services 
concentration, defined as the ratio of services provided by the primary financial institution 
to the total number of services the firm utilizes. The descriptive statistics revealed that sam-
ple firms, on average, purchase 68% of financial services from the primary institution. We 
investigate the extent to which this behavior depends on the contacting approach by means 
of OLS and TE estimation, as in previous analysis.
Table 8 reports the regression results. The positive and statistically significant (p = 1%) 
coefficient on in-person is common in both estimation models. Significant are also the 
inverse Mills ratio and the χ2 statistic in the Wald test, underlining, once again, the need 
to control for endogeneity. This association, surviving in the individual survey rounds, 
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implies that, when relationships are built on face-to-face communication, the primary bank 
acts as a one-stop shop for the totality of the small firm’s financial needs. In turn, this posi-
tively impacts the entire range of available services. Together, the evidence from all four 
proxies for relationship strength supports H4, elucidating how in-person banking results 
into loyal customers who generate more revenue—this is clearly valuable from the bank’s 
perspective.
5.2.2  In‑person contact and loan contracting
To examine whether value also accrues to the other end of the relationship, as predicted 
by our fifth hypothesis, we collect additional information on borrowing cost and maturity 
from individual loan contracts made between the firms and their primary financial insti-
tution. This gives rise to the proxy variables of interest rate7 and maturity measured in 
months. In addition, we use loan amount and prime rate, both measured at the time of the 
loan application, as the loan-specific controls in the subsequent regressions. We restrict 
the analysis to the most recently approved loans with interest rates in excess of prime rate, 
which leaves a total of 3,264 observations (1,497 from NSSBF 1993, 500 from SSBF1998, 
and 1,267 from SSBF2003).
5.2.2.1 In‑person contact and  borrowing cost To test H.5.a., we conduct OLS and TE 
regressions, reporting the results in Table 9. In the TE regressions, we instrument in-person, 
as before, by the exogenous variable in-person environment, which does not associate with 
interest rate. According to the pooled data regressions, our evidence suggests that the inter-
est rate on the loans obtained by firms contacting their primary financial institution mainly 
in-person is, on average, 11 basis points lower than the interest rate on loans issued to the 
rest of the firms (the difference is 22 basis points according to the OLS estimate which we, 
however, discard due to endogeneity). The individual survey rounds yield qualitatively simi-
lar results. On this basis, in-person communicators’ access to cheaper credit proves robust. 
Furthermore, borrowing cost inversely relates to the loan amount (Degryse and Cayseele 
2000; Lian 2018) as well as owners’ age and educational attainment (Wu and Chua 2012).
To further strengthen our interpretation that borrowing cost declines because of face-to-
face communication mitigating the informational wedge with the primary financial institu-
tion, we next focus on two types of firms that have a greater disadvantage at hardening 
information: young firms, due to limited organizational experience, and firms owned by 
individuals without a university degree, due to lack in educational capital. For this analy-
sis, we create two augmented forms of the borrowing cost specification: the first includes 
the interaction term in-person × startup and the second the interaction in-person × below 
degree. Table 10 reports the 2nd-stage results of instrumental variables estimation for both 
specifications. Models 1 to 4 show that while start-up firms are, in general, associated with 
a higher borrowing cost, they are able to borrow cheaper when adhering to in-person bank-
ing. Analogously, in Models 5 to 8, the borrowing cost is higher for non-university gradu-
ate owners, however, cheaper loans are attainable if these owners shift to predominantly 
in-person communication. Jointly, these results confirm the capacity of in-person commu-
nication to compensate for a firm’s heightened information opacity.
7 This represents the marginal borrowing cost, following Wu and Chua (2012).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The value of in-person banking: evidence from U.S. small…
1 3
5.2.2.2 In‑person contact and loan maturity We test H.5.b. in an identical procedure with 
H.5.a. and report the results in Table 11. Again, a highly endogenous relationship between the 
dependent variable and in-person surfaces. The TE model indicates that the maturity of the 
most recently issued loan to firms contacting their primary financial institution in-person is, 
according to the pooled data results, on average, 3.37 months longer than the maturity granted 
to firms opting for impersonal banking. The longer maturity, also evident in each individual 
SSBF round, substantiates the positive effect of soft information on credit availability.
If firms most severely plagued by information opacity are able to attain lower interest 
rates by face-to-face communication, we also expect a favorable effect on loan maturity. 
We, therefore, interact in-person with both start-up and below degree to gauge whether a 
more level informational playing field can further prolong maturity. Table 12 reports the 
 2nd-stage regression results of our instrumental variables estimation. Confirming our pre-
dictions, the results in Models 1–4 indicate that the maturity for start-up firms is shorter, 
however, it can be substantially extended by in-person communication. Models 5–8 convey 
similar insight based on owners’ education. Owners lacking a university degree are gener-
ally granted a shorter maturity, with credit becoming available for a longer period of time 
should they choose to address the branch people face-to-face. Combined with our evidence 
on borrowing cost, we see face-to-face communication influencing two important loan con-
tracting terms8 in a direction which creates value for the small firm; the higher the informa-
tion asymmetry with the primary financial institution, the greater the value-added.
5.2.3  In‑person contact and discouraged borrowing
A dark side of in-person contact might be that it undermines objectivity in the lending decision 
as, for example, by being conducive to bonding or manipulation. In such a case, our previous 
findings on the strength of banking relationships and advantageous contractual terms attained 
by in-person communicators, could substantiate a market friction whereby banks are incapable 
of properly filtering the available supply of soft information. In this respect, we test our final 
hypothesis in the paper about the differential effect of in-person contact on Kon and Storey’s 
(2003) concept of discouraged borrowing based on borrowers’ quality. Conceivably, evidence 
showing less discouragement among good quality borrowers with no such effect on bad qual-
ity borrowers would be pivotal in ruling out this alternative interpretation of our results.
We assemble the discoursed borrowing sample in a twofold process. First, we scrutinize 
our baseline sample for firms which refrained from submitting a loan application when 
they were actually in need of bank credit. As we find, out of 3604 firms that identified 
themselves as capital seekers (i.e. pursued financing within the 3-year period preceding the 
survey), 853 conceded self-rationing due to fear of rejection.9 We flag such cases with the 
dummy variable discouragement. Second, we follow Han et al. (2009) and factor in differ-
ences in prospective borrowers’ quality as captured by Dun and Bradstreet’s credit scores. 
Specifically, we classify10 capital seekers into two (good and bad quality) types of borrow-
ers and draw separate evidence from each subsample. Intuition and some empirical evi-
dence (Ferrando and Mulier 2014; Bhaird et al. 2016) suggest that discouraged borrowers 
9 Both numbers are based on the 1998 and 2003 survey rounds, the only rounds for which Dun and Brad-
street’s credit score data is available.
10 In SSBF 1998, the score ranges from 1 (lowest risk) to 5 (highest risk) with a mean value of 2.99. We 
define as good (bad) borrowers the finance seekers below (above) this average. In SSBF 2003, the score 
ranges from 1 (highest risk) to 6 (lowest risk) with an average of 3.61. We define as good (bad) borrowers 
the finance seekers with a credit score above (below) this average.
8 Loan covenants could yield additional insight, unfortunately the survey questions exclude this feature.
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are usually of higher operating risk, attaching a non-random component to the phenom-
enon. To account for possible selection bias, we supplement probit estimation with an RBP 
model where the first-stage instrument, consistent with previous analyses, is the exogenous 
variable in-person environment.
The regression estimates provide empirical validation to our subsampling approach. In 
Table 13, good borrowers display: (1) a negative coefficient on in-person which is statisti-
cally significant at 5% level (RBP model); and (2) strong evidence of endogeneity with 
both the Fisher’s z transformed correlation and the χ2 in the Wald test to attain significance 
at the 5% level. The effect is economically important with the probability of discourage-
ment to subside by 13.19% (Model 4). Table 14 reports the results obtained from the bad 
borrowers’ sample. Of note is that both the Fisher’s z transformed correlation and the χ2 
in the Wald test suggest the exogeneity of in-person in the RBP models. Consequently, we 
rely on probit estimation which generates insignificant coefficients on in-person. Based on 
these results, lower quality firms are shown to lack an apparent incentive to self-select into 
a certain communication method with the primary bank. Because the effect remains exclu-
sive to good borrowers, i.e. the type of firms which stand to benefit from the leveling of 
the informational playing field, we infer that the latter function comprises the prime mech-
anism by which in-person banking influences discouraged borrowing. Han et  al. (2009) 
describe discouragement as an efficient self-rationing process which encourages good bor-
rowers and precludes those of dubious quality. We show that the process can further gain 
in efficiency from face-to-face communication. More generally, we prove that the positive 
influence of in-person contact is extensible from the firm-bank system to the economy-
wide capital allocation.
6  Summary and concluding remarks
Relationship banking is distinguished by the capacity to operationalize soft information—
an impossibility under alternative banking technologies. This capacity is valuable to the 
extent that soft information adds efficiency to financial processes and, indeed, theory sug-
gests that it does. Absent is, however, the empirical evidence that could put the postulated 
benefits in perspective, with the extant studies tracing relationship banking effects at an 
aggregate level only. Addressing this void, our study offers a rigorous analysis of the mech-
anism that actually generates soft information, in-person communication.
Using data from the Federal Reserve’s 1993, 1998 and 2003 Survey of Small Busi-
ness Finances, we first develop the profile of firms opting for face-to-face interactions with 
their main bank. This is compatible with informationally opaque organizations and firms 
operating in rural areas. We also find that small business owners are more likely to visit 
the bank premises if they are female, older, and less educated. Next, we direct our atten-
tion to the implications of in-person communication and document incremental value for 
both ends of the bank-firm relationship. From the small business perspective, borrowing 
becomes cheaper and available for a longer period of time, reducing the likelihood of self-
imposed rationing among firms of good quality. From the bank perspective, not only client 
loyalty increases but also firms tend to purchase a wider range of financial services. In light 
of this evidence, we caution that technological automation in the banking industry should 
aim to supplement, not obviate, interpersonal communication.
Future research, among other possible directions, can blend our findings with those 
of previous studies to develop a more symmetrical understanding of soft information 
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production: if loan officers and branch managers impact differently on the recipient end 
of the process (Berger and Udell 2002; Uchida et al. 2012; Hattori et al. 2015), it is likely 
that heterogeneity also resides on the transmitting end. Conditional on data availability, 
it would be interesting to compare the effects of soft information generated by different 
stakeholders communicating on the firm’s behalf (e.g. owner and family, employees, busi-
ness partners, members of the local community).
Appendix 1: Regression with treatment effects (TE)
The length of the banking relationship (relationship length) can be expressed as follows:
where X represents a vector of banking market and firm-specific characteristics; in-person 
is a dichotomous variable; and ε stands for the residual term, ε ~ [0, σ2]. In-personi itself 
is determined by a set of variables Zi which comprise the instrumental variable (in-person 
environment) and the Xi vector. We further assume that there is a continuous variable in-
person*i, where:
and ξ ~ [0, 1].









Heckman (1979) suggests that the selection bias in OLS estimates may be rectified with 
the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio through the 2-stage procedure described below:
Similarly,
Subtracting Eq. (6) from Eq. (5), the treatment effects (TE) are:
(3)relationship lengthi =  + Xi +  in-personi + i
(4)in-person∗i =  Zi + i
(5)
E(relationship length)|in-person = 1) =  + X +  + E(|in-person = 1)














E(relationship length)|in-person = 0) =  + � X +  + E(|in-person = 0)



















TE = E(relationship length)|in-person = 1) − E(relationship length)|in-person = 0)
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where φ denotes the standard normal density function and Φ the standard normal cumula-
tive distribution function. Thus, including the inverse Mills ratio (λ) into Eqs. (3) and (4), 
with λ = (ωZ
�)
Φ(ωZ�)
 if in-person = 1 and λ = −(ωZ
�)
1−Φ(ωZ�)
 if in-person = 0, the resulting coefficients 
become least affected by selection bias (Greene 2012; Gounopoulos et al. 2017).
Appendix 2: Recursive bivariate probit (RBP) regression
We use the recursive bivariate probit (RBP) method to estimate the regression on the exclu-
sivity of banking relationships. In accord with the binary nature of the dependent variable, 
we specify the following equation:
where X represents a vector of banking market and firm-specific characteristics; in-person 
is a dichotomous variable; and u stands for the residual term, u ~ [0, σ2]. Let exclusivity∗
i
 
represent a latent continuous variable as follows:
In addition, we specify the in-personi equation as:
where Z includes the X vector of Eq.  (8) and the instrumental variable (in-person 
environment).
We further assume a latent continuous variable in-person∗
i
 as follows:
















 . Using F(·,·)11 to denote the joint distribution function of ( u′ , ′ ) and 
assuming symmetric distributions for the error terms of Eqs. (9) and (11), the expected 
probability distribution is given below:
Accordingly, the likelihood function to be maximized is:












= 𝛽�Xi + 𝜔
� in-person + u�
i
.
















P11 = Prob(exclusivity = 1, in-person = 1) = F
(
�X + �,  �Z, 
)




P01 = Prob(exclusivity = 0, in-person = 1) = F
(
−�X − �,  �Z,−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Hence, by maximizing the loglikelihood function, least biased estimates are attainable 
(Maddala 1983, pp. 122–124; Greene 2012, pp 778–789).
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